




We propose a variation of the non-cooperative bargaining model for n-person
games in coalitional form, introduced in Hart and Mas-Colell (1996). This strategic
game implements, in the limit, a new NTU-value for the class of monotonic games.
This value coincides with the Consistent NTU-value (Maschler and Owen,1989) for
hyperplane games, and with the Shapley value for TU games (Shapley, 1953). The
main characteristic of this proposal is that always select a unique payo¤ allocation.
This value can also be considered as an extension of the Nash bargaining solution
(Nash,1950). Variations of this model yield extensions of the Discrete Rai¤a solution
(Rai¤a, 1953), and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975).
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
We consider in this paper n-person cooperative games in coalitional form. In this setting
partial cooperation is allowed between players. Lotteries over outcomes are also feasible
and we assume that players’ preferences over outcomes are represented by von Neuman-
Morgenstern utility functions. A n-person coalitional form is given by a couple (N;V),
where N is a …nite set of n players and V is a function that assigns a subset V (S) of RS
to every coalition S ½ N. V (S) is interpreted as the set of payo¤ vectors to the members
of S that would be feasible if S where the group of deciding players.
When utility is transferable across players (TU-games) the most prominent solution
concept is the Shapley (1953) value. It yields a unique expected payo¤ allocation for the
players in the game. The original Shapley’s support for the value was axiomatic. Other
relevant axiomatizations of the value are in Myerson (1980), and Hart and Mas-Colell
(1989). Bargaining models that yields the value in the TU-case have been also proposed.
Among them can be cited Gul (1989), Hart and Moore (1990), Hart and Mas-Colell
(1996), Winter (1994), and Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001).
When utility is not transferable (NTU-games), di¤erent ways to extend the value
have been considered. The most relevant are due to Harsanyi (1963), Shapley (1969)1,
and Maschler and Owen (1992)2. These three solutions were constructed in such way
that they coincide with the Nash (1950) solution for pure bargaining games (i.e., only the
coalition of all players can reach an agreement). Axiomatic support for these solutions
have been done by Aumann (1985) for the Shapley NTU-value, by Hart (1985) for the
Harsanyi NTU-value, and by de Clippel, Peters and Zank (2002) and by Hart (2003) for
1The Shapley NTU-value is also called as ¸-transfer value.
2First introduced for hyperplane games in Maschler and Owen (1989), and known also as the Consistent
NTU-value.
2the Maschler-Owen NTU-value. Only for the Consistent NTU-value has been proposed a
n-person bargaining procedure in Hart and Mas-Colell (1996).
All these three extensions of the value have in common the same well known problem:
They do not guarantee uniqueness in the payo¤s vector solution.
Perhaps the multiplicity of the outcomes is not a trouble if we wish to interpret the
solutions from a descriptive point of view. The same phenomena happens in many others
contexts, as in the Walrasian equilibria, or in the Nash equilibria and its re…nements for
non-cooperative games. But from a normative point of view, two di¤erent Pareto optimal
outcomes put the players in a con‡ict. Which outcome should be selected? As far as
the election is done, some players have been bene…ted and the rest harmed with respect
the alternatives discarded. If we wish to solve this impasse by using a fair lottery among
the outcomes selected the expected payo¤ will usually be ine¢cient, which is not a good
criteria for a cooperative solution.
In the present paper we follow a strategic approach, starting with a modi…ed version
of the bargaining procedure of Hart and Mas-Colell (1996), in which the only change is
produced in the way to solve the breakdown in the negotiations. It will be showed that the
equilibria of this bargaining game implements in the limit a new single-valued solution.
Restricted to pure bargaining problems, the point selected is the maximization of utility
gains from a reference breakdown point, so it is very similar to the Nash solution. When
we deal with TU-games it is selected the Shapley value, and in Hyperplane games it is
selected the Consistent NTU-value.
The interest of this breakdown technology lies also in the fact that maintaining the
same breakdown rule, but changing the negotiation procedure, it can be considered single
value extensions of solutions that were de…ned only for pure bargaining games. We present
two examples: The Discrete Rai¤a solution (Rai¤a, 1953), made by de Clippel (2002),
3and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975).
Following this Introduction, Section 2 discusses the non-uniqueness aspect with a two-
person problem, and the way to solved this problem by the modi…cation of the breakdown
rule is o¤ered. In Section 3 it is de…ned with more detail the general bargaining procedure,
di¤erentiating, in each round, the Negotiating stage from the Breakdown stage. The next
Sections consider di¤erent ways to de…ne the Negotiation stage: Section 4 considers the
Alternating O¤ers with Risk of Breakdown model, yielding an extension of the Nash
solution. Section 5 considers the Alternating O¤ers with Finete Horizon model, yielding
an extension of the Discrete Rai¤a solution. Finally, Section 6 considers the Auctioning
Countero¤er’s Chance model, yielding an extension of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution.
2A t w o - p e r s o n e x a m p l e
We start with a simple bankruptcy problem to illustrate the problems in which players
can be involved when they follow a solution concept that don’t satisfy the uniqueness
requirement.
The state is 100 units and there are two potential claimants arguing 75 units of debts
each one. Assume that these debts are not well documented, so each claimant must put
his claim in a Court in order to determine his legitimateness. We normalize by cero the
payo¤ of a claimant which decide to not litigate. If only one claimant litigates, we assume
that the magistrate is ready to accept his claim, and then his payo¤ is 75. In case both
litigate, the magistrate must to check carefully the validity of the proofs presented by the
claimants. Assume that only four outcomes are considered by law. If the magistrate …nd
that both claims are well-grounded then the state must be shared equally, so the payo¤s
are (50,50). If only one demand is valid, the claimant accepted receives his debt and
4the claimant rejected receives cero, so the payo¤s are either (75,0) or (0,75). If both are
rejected they will receive cero. In addition, the claimants are allowed to agree about what
of these four alternatives be the …nal outcome proposed in the Court. They can bargaining
previously any lottery among these four alternatives, and we assume that utilities over
lotteries of claimants are von Neumann-Morgenstern type, and risk neutral. Therefore
the feasible expected payo¤s that both claimants can guarantee by cooperation are done
b yt h ec o n v e xh u l lo fA = f(50;50);(75;0);(0;75);(0;0)g.
Here the set of players is N = f1;2g and V is de…ned by
V (fig)=fx : x · vig where vi =7 5 ;i2 N;
and
V (N)=conv(A) ¡ R
2
+;
(“conv” denotes “convex hull”). The sets V (¢) are also comprehensive (utility is freely
disposable). V (N) i sr e p r e s e n t e di nF i g u r e1 . 3.
Now applying the Consistent NTU-value to this example4 the solution selects three
possible outcomes: c1 =( 5 6 :25;37:5), c2 =( 3 7 :5;56:25),a n dc3 =( 5 0 ;50).I fw ew i s ht o
follow a strategic approach, we should o¤er some prespeci…ed bargaining rule that allows
to the players …nd an agreement themselves.
In Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) it is o¤ered a bargaining procedure that supports the
Consistent NTU-value5, that in our two person case goes as follows:
² “Choose a player i 2 N = f1;2g by tossing a coin.
3This example is basically an adaptation of the “reverse pure bargaining problem” given in Hart and
Mas-Colell (1996), Section 4, pag. 365.
4For a detailed description of the Consistent NTU-value the reader is referred to Hart and Mas-Colell
(1996), and in particular Section 4, pags. 366-367.









² Player i proposes a payo¤ vector ai 2 V (N).
² Player j is asked if agree or dissent.
-A g r e e) ai is implemented.
-D i s s e n t s)
? With probability ½, the game repeats.
? With probability 1 ¡ ½, breakdown occurs.”
The key aspect in this model is how breakdown is de…ned. Because it is intended that
feasible payo¤s of subcoalitions play a role in determination of …nal payo¤s, it is given a
chance that agreements for subcoalitions can happen in the end. With this intention at
hand, breakdown means that the proposer i disappears, and the game repeats with the
remainder player. In our example player i leaves player j alone to make the claim in the
court. This bargaining procedure have always a stationary perfect equilibria. The game
6is solved by induction. When a player iclaims alone his/her payo¤ is vi. The equilibrium
equations which determine the proposals in N are:
a
i(½) 2 @V(N), (i 2 N),( 1 )
i.e., the proposals are e¢cient, and
a
i
j(½)=½aj(½)+( 1¡ ½)vj, (j 6= i),( 2 )










That is, player i o¤ers to player j just what will get in case to reject the proposal:
a(½) in case the game repeats, and vj in case breakdown happens.





















which, in our example, yield two di¤erent solutions: fa1(½);a 2(½)g and fe1(½);e 2(½)g that,
when ½ ! 1,c o n v e r g et oc1 and c2 respectively (see Figure 2).
First note that this bargaining procedure not allways allows to approximate to all
payo¤s solutions: In our example the point c3 =( 5 0 ;50) is excluded. Second, we have
multiplicity: we can approximate to either c1 or c2. I fw eh a v en or e a s o n sap r i o r it o
discriminate between claimants 1 and 2, the only fair way to choose between c1 and c2 is
by tossing a coin. But therefore the expected payo¤s are (46:875;46:875) that are Pareto
dominated by (50;50).F r o manormative point of view, propose rules of cooperation that
yield asymmetric outcomes in symmetric problems is a bit hardly task. Both aspects,













rules of cooperation. Can we change in some way the bargaining procedure to avoid this
multiplicity of solutions?
Given the usual convexity assumption, the Nash bargaining solution (Nash, 1950)
always select a unique point if the disagreement point belongs to the interior of the
feasible set. Hence, a natural strategy to solve this question could be by changing the
breakdown process in such a way that the expectations of the players in case of breakdown
be also feasible. There is a natural and simple way for that, and this is what we want to
explore here.
We propose the following breakdown procedure: Assume as before that N = f1;2g is
the set of players negotiating. If breakdown happens:
² “Choose a player i 2 N = f1;2g by tossing a coin.
² Player i proposes a payo¤ vector ui 2 V (N).
8² Player j is asked if agree or dissent.
-A g r e e) ui is implemented.
-D i s s e n t s)player i leaves the game, receiving a payo¤ of cero, and player j
receives his claim vj.
With this breakdown rule the equilibrium proposals ui are characterized by
u




j = vj, ( j 6= i).( 4 )










which, given the convexity assumption on V (N), belongs to the feasible set too.
In our previous example, if a claimant is compelled to make an ultimatum o¤er to the
other one, he must o¤er 75 units because this what the other claimant would obtain if
the proposer is forced to leave the game in case of rejection. Hence the expectations in








The Hart and Mas-Colell bargaining model, with this new breakdown rule, applied
to our example reduces to the well known “random order proposer with risk of break-
down event equal to u” (See Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky, 1986). The equilibrium
conditions for this two-person case are
a




j(½)=½aj(½)+( 1¡ ½)uj, (j 6= i).





















(2 ¡ ½)½(a1(½) ¡ u1)(a2(½) ¡ u2).
Therefore, we fall into the classical implementation of the Nash Bargaining solution from
the disagreement point u.T h a ti s ,w h e n½ ! 1,w eh a v et h a tai(½) ! a(½) for i =1 ;2,
and a(½) ! (50;50), which, in our example, is the point that maximizes the product of










Although in this example our procedure yields, in the limit, a point that belongs to
the set of Consistent NTU-value allocations, i.e. the point c3 =( 5 0 ;50), this is not true
10in general (see Remark 3, in Section 4 above).
In next two Sections we extend this procedure for more than two players.
3B r e a k d o w n
Let N = f1;:::;ng be a …nite set of players. A coalition is a subset of N.I fx;y 2 RN,
we write x ¸ y if xi ¸ yi for all i 2 N,a n dx>yif xi >y i for all i 2 N.I f x 2 RN
and ;6 = S ½ N,w ew r i t exS as the restriction of x to S, i.e., xS =( xi)i2S 2 RS.L e t
RN
+ := fx 2 RN j x ¸ 0g and RN
++ := fx 2 RN j x>0g.L e t A ½ RN, A is called
comprehensive if A ¡ RN
+ ½ A. The boundary of A is denoted by @A. We say that the
boundary is non level if for all x 2 @A it holds that fxg¡RN
+ \ @A = fxg.
A non-transferable utility game (NTU-game for short), is a pair (N;V),w h e r eN is a
…nite set of players, and V is a map assigning to each coalition S, ;6 = S ½ N,as u b s e t
V (S) ½ RS of attainable payo¤ vectors such that
(A.1) V (S) is non-empty, closed, convex and comprehensive.
(A.2) @V(S) is non level.
(A.3) 0S 2 V (S) and V0(S): =V (S) \ RS
+ is bounded.
(A.4) Monotonicity: V0(S) £f 0TnSg½V0(T) whenever S ½ T:
The last assumption A.4 is just the extension on NTU-games of the classical Mono-
tonicity assumption for TU-games. The family of all NTU-games on N satisfying A.1-A.4
will be denoted by GN.
For each i 2 N,l e tvi := maxfx : x 2 V (i)g.D e n o t e b y v =( vi)i2N 2 RN.S o m e
particular classes of NTU-games have been played a relevant role in the analysis: The
transferable utility games (TU-games), when there is a real-valued function v(¢) such that
V (S)=fx 2 RS :
P
i2S xi · v(S)g for all S ½ N.T h e Hyperplane games (H-games),
11when @V(S) is a hyperplane for all S ½ N.A n d Pure Bargaining games (PB-games),
when v =02 V (N),a n dvS =0 S 2 @V(S),f o ra l lS 6= N.
A payo¤ con…guration is a family p =
¡
pS¢
S½N where pS 2 RS for all S ½ N.F o r
notational simplicity, we use Sni and S [ i instead of Snfig and S [f ig respectively.
We describe here the general rules of the multilateral bargaining procedure in which
the solutions will be based.
² “In each round there is a set S ½ N of active players. When we deal with single
coalitions, S = fig, i 2 N, every player obtains its own value vi.
² In the …rst round, the active set is S = N.
² Every round, with active player set S,( jSj¸2), is divided in two Stages:T h e
Negotiation stage and the Breakdown stage.
² Negotiation stage. We don’t want to be precise at this point. Here players make
o¤ers that are accept or reject by the other players following some speci…ed rules. The
only important at this step is that we can exit from this stage only in two ways: Either,
at some moment one player makes an o¤er that is accepted, then the game …nish with
an agreement and this o¤er is implemented; either, after some rejection, the stage stops
without agreement and we go to the Breakdown stage.
² Breakdown stage. Choose a player i at random from S using a uniform distribution.
Then i plays the following ultimatum game, U(i;S):
¡ Player i proposes a payo¤ vector ui;S 2 V (S).
¡ Other players in Sni are asked if they agree or dissent.
- All agree ) ui;S is implemented.
- Any player dissents ) player i leaves the game, receiving a payo¤ of cero, and
go to a new round with active players set Sni.”
12It is worth noting that we have making the implicit assumption that the utilities are
previously normalized in such a way that when every player leaves the game the payo¤
that he/she obtains is cero. Therefore, Monotonicity allows the chance to reach bene…t
agreements.
The next Lemma gives the payo¤s associated to every ultimatum game de…ned in
(N;V) 2 GN.
Lemma 1 Let U(i;S) be an ultimatum game for player i in S, jSj¸2. Assume that
pSni 2 V0(Sni) is the unique payo¤ vector that players in Sni expect to obtain in the round





j for all j 2 Sni, is the unique payo¤ vector associated to any subgame perfect
equilibria (SPE) of U(i;S).
Proof. First note that under the Monotonicity assumption, if pSni 2 V0(Sni) it holds
that u
i;S
i ¸ 0.B y c o n s t r u c t i o n , ui;S is unique and ui;S 2 V0(S).T h e p l a y e r s j in Sni




j . Therefore, if u
i;S
i > 0, the best player i
c a nd oi st oo ¤ e rai;S = ui;S, that will be accepted for all j 2 Sni.I f u
i;S
i =0 ,p l a y e r
i is indi¤erent between either o¤ering ui;S that will be accepted, and o¤ering a di¤erent
proposal ai;S 6= ui;S such that a
i;S





j , because A.1 and A.2 imply that @V(S) coincides with the Pareto
frontier of V (S), therefore ai;S will be rejected by player j.I nb o t hc a s e si will obtain 0
and the rest of players j 2 Sni obtain p
Sni
j , which again coincides with ui;S6.









6In this indi¤ernt case, also mixed strategies yield the same outcome.
13Note that, because all ui;S 2 @V0(S), the convexity of V (S) implies that uS 2 V0(S).I f
the rules of the negotiation stage are such that for subcoalitions Sni (i 2 S) yield unique
expected payo¤s pSni 2 V0(Sni),w eh a v et h a tuS are the expectations for players in S
when breakdown happens.
Given this breakdown rule, some results can be advanced for particular games.
Let us assume that the rules of the negotiation stage are de…ned in such a way that
the equilibrium payo¤s pS are always greater or equal than the breakdown payo¤s uS.I n
this case we have the next straightforward Theorem.
Theorem 2 Let p =
¡
pS¢
S½N be the equilibrium payo¤s con…guration associated to the
multilaterateral bargaining, such that pS ¸ uS, for all S ½ N,T h e np coincides with the
Consistent NTU-value for Hyperplane games, and with the Shapley value for TU-games.
















i ; (i 2 S): (6)
The formula above determines recursively the Consistent NTU-value of Maschler and
Owen (1989) for H-games. In TU-games, u
i;S
i = v(S) ¡ v(Sni), therefore formula (6)
yields the Shapley (1953) value for TU-games.
Remark 1. If we wish a true implementation (that is, not in expectations) we only
need to consider either players break ties in favor of quick termination of the game,
or the player responsible for the breakdown stage (player who has made the last o¤er
rejected) must to pay to the Referee a positive amount of money. We will make the same
assumptions for the negotiation stages of the three models considered below.
In the next sections we consider three di¤erent bargaining procedures in the negotiation
stage.
144 Alternating o¤ers with risk of breakdown
Perhaps one of the most popular models of bargaining is the alternating o¤ers with risk of
breakdown (…rst introduced in Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky, 1986). In that context,
breakdown enforces the status quo payo¤s. The remarkable result obtained is that, when
the probability of breakdown goes to cero, the equilibrium payo¤s converge towards the
Nash bargaining solution.
This alternating o¤ers procedure was also the Hart and Mas-Colell’s model chosen for
the Negotiation stage. Formally:
² Negotiation stage.“ A s s u m et h a tS ½ N (jS ¸ 2j) is the active players set and let ½
be a …xed parameter, 0 · ½<1.
Choose a player i at random from S using a uniform distribution.
Player i proposes a payo¤ vector ai;S 2 V (S).
Other players are asked if they agree or dissent.
- All agree ) ai;S is implemented.
- Any player dissents )
? With probability ½ , repeat the process.
? With probability 1 ¡ ½, go to Breakdown stage.”
It is worth noting that this way to de…ne the Negotiation stage is completely consistent
with the Breakdown stage. Each time is chosen a proposer randomly: If the o¤er is
rejected, with probability ½ next time we repeat the process, and with probability 1 ¡ ½
next time will be the last time in which a random proposer will be chosen.
The negotiation stage have potentially in…nitely many periods, and with more than
two active players it is well known that many subgame perfect equilibria strategies appear.
Hence, as usual, we restrict to consider only stationary strategies. The characterization
15of the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE) strategies of the Negotiation stages
a r eg i v e nb yt h en e x tL e m m a .
Lemma 3 Let a round with active player set S ½ N (jSj¸2), the proposals correspond-
ing to an SSPE in the negotiation stage are always accepted, and they are characterized
by:
a





j (½)+( 1¡ ½)u
S








i (½) ¸ 0, for all i 2 S,a n daS(½) ¸ uS(½).
The proposition says that i makes o¤ers such that he will obtain his maximum payo¤
compatible by giving to the rest of players what they would expect to obtain if the o¤er
were rejected
Proof. The proof of this Lemma is just a straightforward adaptation of the arguments
given in Hart and Mas-Colell (1996, Proposition 1). The only di¤erences are that, in case
of breakdown, player j will obtain now uS
j (½) instead of a
Sni
j (½), because the di¤erent
way in which it is de…ned. Starting with jSj =2 , it is easy to see that Monotonicity
implies that uS(½) ¸ 0, and the following strategy will guarantee to i a payo¤ of at
least aS
i (½) ¸ uS
i (½): accept only if o¤ered at least uS
i (½) and, when proposing, propose
uS(½) 2 V (S). This implies that a
i;S
i (½) ¸ uS
i (½),a n da
j;S
i (½) ¸ uS
i (½). Therefore it holds
that ai;S(½) ¸ uS(½),a n daS(½) ¸ uS(½). The rest of the proof is left to the reader.
We de…ne now the payo¤ con…guration that will be supported in the limit by the
equilibria of the bargaining game. The construction is made recursively, starting with
single coalitions fig, for all i 2 N, up to the grand coalition N.
16De…nition 1 The payo¤ con…guration ®=
¡
®S¢
S½N is de…ned by:
(®:i) ®i = vi for all i 2 N.
(®:ii)F o ra l lS ½ N,w i t hjSj¸2,l e tuS := 1
jSj
P
i2S ui;S, where, for all i 2 S, ui;S are




j for all j 2 Sni.












for all S ½ N,w i t hjSj¸2.
Note that under the regularity conditions imposed to (N;V),e a c hui;S is unique,
and if ®Sni 2 V0(Sni), by Monotonicity, we have that u
i;S
i ¸ 0,a n dt h e nui;S 2 V0(S).
Moreover, by Convexity, uS 2 V0(S).T h e p o i n t ®S is the Nash bargaining solution for
the PB-problem (uS;V 0(S)),w h e r eV0(S) i st h ef e a s i b l es e t ,a n duS play the role of the
disagreement point. We have that ®S is unique, ®S ¸ uS and ®S 2 @V0(S).
Remark 2. It should be clear that Monotonicity is not needed in order to de…ne
the payo¤ con…guration ®. Monotonicity is needed to guarantee that u
i;S
i ¸ 0 because
®Sni 2 V0(Sni), that will be of importance only when the ultimatum game U(i;S) be
played in the breakdown stage. Convexity guarantee the uniqueness of ®S.
We are in condition to establish the main result of this Section.
Theorem 4 Suppose that (N;V) is an NTU-game satisfying the regularity conditions
A.1-A.4, with the additional Smoothness assumption: For each S ½ N, at each point of
@V(N) there is a single outward normal direction. Then for each 0 · ½<1 there is an
SSP equilibrium. Moreover, as ½ ! 1 every SSP equilibrium payo¤ con…guration a(½)
converges to ®.
17Proof. This is almost a corollary of previous results in the Nash bargaining im-
plementation literature7. First note that, by Monotonicity, Lemmas (1) and (3) alto-
gether yield that uS (½) 2 V0(S), ai;S(½) 2 @V0(S), for all i 2 S,a n daS(½) 2 V0(S)
for all S ½ N. Therefore, let (M;:::;M) 2 RN




j (½) ¡ aS
j (½)
¯ ¯
¯ · M(1 ¡ ½) for all i;j 2 S,a n da l lS ½ N. Therefore, when ½ ! 1,





















, (i 2 S): (7)








The only di¤erence with the implementation of the Nash bargaining solution ®S of the
PB-problem (uS;V 0(S)), is that the disagreement point uS (½) is not …xed. But following
an straightforward induction argument, when ½ ! 1,w eh a v et h a tuS (½) ! uS,a n dt h e n
ai;S(½) ! ®S, for all S ½ N. Note here that for jS ¸ 3j the set of equilibrium o¤ers
ai;S(½) are not necessarily unique; and without smoothness on @V(S), the convergence to
®S may fail8.
Remark 3. It is clear that in PB-games, ®N do not coincide with the Nash solution,
because the maximization of the product of utility gains is taken from the breakdown
point, instead the disagreement point as in the Nash solution (see Figure 4).
7See for example Hart and Mas-Colell (1996), Theorem 3; and Thomson and Lensberg (1989).








Moreover, ®N depends of the breakdown point uN which depends of points ui;N,h e n c e
®N don’t satis…es the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives axiom. An early work in
which the breakdown point is used to compute the maximization of the utility gains
product can be found in Roth (1977).
Remark 4. Asymmetric solutions can be de…ned easily. We only need to assume
that players are chosen to be the proposer with di¤erent probabilities. Let w 2 RN
++ be a
v e c t o ro fw e i g h t ss u c ht h a tp l a y e r sa r ec h o s e ni np r o p o r t i o nt ot h e s ew e i g h t s .








i = vi for all i 2 N.






i;S,w h e r e ,f o ra l li 2 S,
u[w]
i;S are the vectors in RS such that u[w]



















for all S ½ N,w i t hjSj¸2.
Now, for any 0 · ½<1, the conditions that characterizes the equilibrium o¤ers are
given by
a[w]





j +( 1¡ ½)u[w]
S






j2S wjai;S [w](½).T h e n ,w h e n½ ! 1,w eh a v et h a ta[w]
i;S (½) !
®[w]
S, for all S ½ N.
In particular, when (N;V) is a H-game, it holds that ®[w]
S = u[w]
S for all S ½ N,
and therefore, ®[w]
S coincides with the weighted Shapley (1953) value for TU-games (see
Kalai and Samet, 1985; and Hart and Mas-Colell, 1989), and with the weighted Consistent
NTU-value for H-games (See Maschler and Owen, 1989; and Calvo, García and Zarzuelo,
2001).
5 Alternating o¤ers with …nite horizon
Replace, in the negotiation stage, the probability of breakdown ½ by a …nite time horizon
T in which o¤ers can be made. We have this alternative procedure.
² Negotiation stage. “Assume that S ½ N (jS ¸ 2j) is the active players set and let T
be a positive integer, 0 <T<1.
20Every time t, t =1 ;2;:::;T, choose a player i at random from S using a uniform
distribution.
Player i proposes a payo¤ vector ai;S(t;T) 2 V (S).
Other players are asked if they agree or dissent.
- All agree ) ai;S(t;T) is implemented.
- Any player dissents )
? If t<T, repeat the process at time t +1 .
? If t = T,g ot ob r e a k d o w ns t a g e . ”
See again that the breakdown stage can be interpreted as the last time (T +1 )i n
which a random proposer will be chosen. This mechanism applied to PB-games yields,
when T !1 ,t h eDiscrete Rai¤a solution, appeared …rst in Luce and Rai¤a (1957),
§6.7. It was conceived as a iterated process of pick up a dictator at random, with equal
probabilities, building a sequence of gradual agreements, …nding in the limit an e¢cient
point in the boundary. It appear also in Moulin (1984) with the name of …nitely repeated
random dictator. See also Sjöström (1991), Mas-Colell (1997), and Gomes, Hart and
Mas-Colell (1999). In the general case of NTU-games, this bargaining model appeared in
de Clippel (2002), implementing a payo¤ allocation called as the Procedural value.F o r
completeness, we show only the main results. The proofs are in the de Clippel’s paper.
The negotiation stage have at most T periods, hence it can be solved by backwards
induction, by using Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) strategies. Their characterization
a r eg i v e nb yt h en e x tL e m m a .
Lemma 5 Let a round with active player set S ½ N (jSj¸2). The proposals, for every
time t · T, corresponding to an SPE in the Negotiation stage are always accepted, and
21they are characterized by:
a









i2S ai;S(t;T), for all t · T,a n daS(T +1 ;T)=uS (T) is the
breakdown point de…ned by uS (T): = 1
jSj
P
i2S ui;S (T),w h e r e ,f o ra l li 2 S, ui;S (T) are




j (1;T) for all j 2 Sni.
Moreover, a
i;S
i (t;T) ¸ aS
i (t +1 ;T) ¸ 0, for all i 2 S,a n daS(t;T) ¸ aS (t +1 ;T).












i2S are always unique, for




i2S in the risk of breakdown model.
22Also only subgame perfect strategies are needed, instead of the stronger requirement of
stationary strategies used in the …rst model.
De…nition 3 The payo¤ con…guration r =
¡
rS¢
S½N is de…ned by:
(r:i) ri = vi for all i 2 N.
(r:ii) For all S ½ N,w i t hjSj¸2,l e tuS := 1
jSj
P
i2S ui;S, where, for all i 2 S, ui;S are




j for all j 2 Sni.






for all S ½ N,w i t hjSj¸2.
Under the regularity assumptions in GN, the payo¤ con…guration r is well de…ned and
rS 2 @V(S),f o ra l lS ½ N. Also Monotonicity is not needed in the construction of r,
only applies for the resolution of the game.
Theorem 6 Suppose that (N;V) is an NTU-game satisfying the regularity conditions
A.1-A.4. Then for each 0 · T<1 there is an SP equilibrium. Moreover, as T !1the




S½N converges to r.
Remark 5. Asymmetries can be considered in the same way as in the previous model,
yielding again weighted Shapley values in TU-games and weighted Consistent values in
H-games.
Remark 6. A combination of the two previous models can be done also. That is,
the Negotiation stage game depends of two parameters: The probability of breakdown
1 ¡ ½, and the …nite horizon T. This approach was …rst considered in Gomes, Hart and
Mas-Colell (1999), studying a …nite horizon version of the bargaining model introduced
23in Hart and Mas-Colell (1996). All their results can also be translated here in a natural
way. We only de…ne the Negotiation stage and the characterization of the equilibrium
proposals.
² Negotiation stage. “Assume that S ½ N (jS ¸ 2j) is the active players set and let T
be a positive integer, 0 <T<1,a n d½ be a …xed parameter, 0 · ½<1.
Every time t, t =1 ;2;:::;T, choose a player i at random from S using a uniform
distribution.
Player i proposes a payo¤ vector ai;S(t;½;T) 2 V (S).
Other players are asked if they agree or dissent.
- All agree ) ai;S(t;½;T) is implemented.
- Any player dissents )
? If t<T, ¦ With probability ½, repeat the process at time t +1 .
¦ With probability 1 ¡ ½, go to Breakdown stage.
? If t = T,g ot oB r e a k d o w ns t a g e . ”
Note that this is a …nite horizon game, hence it is solved by backwards induction and
the equilibrium proposals are given by next Lemma.
Lemma 7 Let a round with active player set S ½ N (jSj¸2). The proposals, for every
time t · T, corresponding to an SPE in the Negotiation stage are always accepted, and
they are characterized by:
a
i;S(t;½;T) 2 @V(S) for all i 2 S,( c . 1 )





j (t +1 ;½;T)+( 1¡ ½)u
S









i2S ai;S(t;½;T), for all t · T,a n duS (½;T) is the breakdown
point de…ned by uS (½;T): = 1
jSj
P
i2S ui;S (½;T), where, for all i 2 S, ui;S (½;T) are the




j (1;½;T) for all j 2 Sni.
Moreover, a
i;S
i (t;½;T) ¸ aS
i (t+1;½;T) ¸ 0, for all i 2 S,a n daS(t;½;T) ¸ aS (t +1 ;½;T),
for all t · T.
6 Auctioning countero¤er’s chance
Perhaps the second most cited solution for PB-problems is the so called Kalai-Smorodinsky
(1975) solution. In this solution the gains of cooperation are shared in proportion with
the utopia payo¤s, that is, the maximal utility that each player can gets compatible with
the disagreement payo¤s for the rest of players. In this Section we o¤er an extension of
this solution on NTU-games.
The …rst implementation of the KS solution was given in Moulin (1984), with the
name of “auctioning of fractions of a dictatorship”. One important di¤erence with the
previous negotiation models considered above is that the Moulin’s game yield an exact
implementation of the KS solution, in contrast with the approximate implementation of
the Nash and Rai¤a solutions. The Negotiation stage that we present now is inspired
by the Moulin’s game. Informally, …rst players auction to determine who makes a fair
o¤er. The auction is over probabilities, and wins the player who announces the highest
probability p¤. If this o¤er is rejected, a player is selected to make a countero¤er, where
the player that rejects the o¤er is selected with probability p¤. If this countero¤er is also
r e j e c t e d ,t h e ng ot ot h eB r e a k d o w ns t a g e 9.
9At …rst glance the model sounds di¤erent from the Moulin’s game, but it is mathematically equiva-
lent. The changes of this version are done only to be more in the spirit of “acceptance/rejection” o¤ers
25² Negotiation stage. “Assume that S ½ N (jS ¸ 2j) is the active players set.
Round 1. Each player i in S makes a bid pi 2 R,b e i n g0 · pi · 1. Next, the players
are renumbered in decreasing order of their bids, i.e. p1 ¸ p2 ¸ ::: ¸ ps. Players with tied
bids are ordered randomly among themselves.
Round 2. Player 1 makes a feasible o¤er a1;S 2 V (S), and the rest of the players in S
are asked sequentially, starting …rst with player s,s e c o n dw i t hs¡1, and so on till player
2, whether they accept or reject the o¤er. If all players accept, a1;S is implemented. If
any player rejects the o¤er, the game goes to round three.
Round 3. Let player k be the …rst player who rejects the o¤er. Choose a player i at
random from S, where the probabilities to be chosen are: p1 for player k,a n d
1¡p1
s¡1 for
every i 2 Snk. The chosen player, say i, makes a feasible countero¤er bi;S 2 V (S).I fa l l
agree, bi;S is implemented. If any player dissent, go to the Breakdown stage.”
Note that in this way, the only di¤erence between the Round 3 and the Breakdown
stage is given by the probability distribution. In the Breakdown stage we use the uniform
distribution, whereas in Round 3 the chance to be selected, for the player who rejects the
fair o¤er, is determined by the winner player in the auction round. The fairness of the
…rst o¤er follows from the fact that the player that wins the auction is who is more ready
to give a chance to make a countero¤er to player who dissents.
We de…ne …rst the payo¤ con…guration that will be the extension of the KS solution.
De…nition 4 The payo¤ con…guration k =
¡
kS¢
S½N is de…ned by:
(k:i) ki = vi for all i 2 N.
For all S ½ N,w i t hjSj¸2:
(k:ii)L e tuS := 1
jSj
P
i2S ui;S,w h e r e ,f o ra l li 2 S, ui;S are the vectors in RS such that
technology applied in the previous Sections.




j for all j 2 Sni.
(k:iii)L e tbi;S 2 @V(S) such that b
i;S
j = uS
j , for all j 2 Sni.















for all i 2 S.
For games in GN the vectors kS are unique, and, again, Monotonicity is not needed
for its de…nition. By non-levelness, if uS 2 intV (S) it holds that 0 <p ¤ < 1.M o r e o v e r ,
kS ¸ uS.
Theorem 8 Suppose that (N;V) is an NTU-game satisfying the regularity conditions
A.1-A.4. Therefore, k =
¡
kS¢
S½N is the payo¤ con…guration associated to any SPE
equilibrium of the bargaining game.




TÃS. First note that by o¤ering uS and rejecting any o¤er di¤erent from
uS, in Rounds 2 and 3, every player i can enforce the breakdown payo¤ uS
i .H e n c e t h e
expected payo¤s in the Negotiation stage, eS, must be greater or equal than uS.T h e n ,i f
uS 2 @V(S) it holds that eS = uS = kS.
Assume that uS 2 intV (S). In Round 3, if any player i is chosen to make a counterof-
fer, will o¤er bi;S satisfying (k:iii) and this o¤er will be accepted by the others. In Round



































, for all i 2 Sn1. Therefore,
c1(p1) is a concave and strictly decreasing function for p1 2 [0;1],w i t hc1(0) = b
1;S
1 .
Moreover, for p¤ satisfying (k:iv), it holds that c1(p¤)=kS
1,a n df o ra l lp1 >p ¤ we have
that c1(p1) <k S
1. Then it is immediate to check that, in any SP equilibrium, at Round 1
all the bids are pi · p¤, and at least two players make a bid equal to p¤, and in Round
2, the winner player makes a fair o¤er a1;S = c1(p¤)=kS that is accepted for the rest of
players.
Note also that in the game reduced to Round 1, there is only one Strong Nash equilibria
(Aumann, 1959) in which all players make a bid equal to p¤; and this strong equilibria is
of “maxmin” type. To see this last, note that if a player i makes a bid p0
i <p ¤,t h ew o r s t
it can happen is that the rest of players tie with the same bid p0
i,a n di is not the winner.
In this case i receives ci(p0
1) <k S
i .I fi bids p00
i >p ¤, the worst it can happen is that i be
the winner, and again he will obtain less than kS
i .
Remark 7. In PB-games, the point kN do not coincides with the KS solution point,
that is de…ned by KSN 2 @V(N) such that
KS
S











for all i 2 N,w h e r ep¤ 2 R+,a n da l lvi;N satisfy that vi;N 2 @V(N) and v
i;N
j = vj =0 ,
for all j 2 Nni (recall that in PB-games v =0 ). See the di¤erence in Figure 6 for the
case N = f1;2g.
An early work in which the breakdown point, instead the disagreement point, is used
to compute the utility gains was in Salonen (1987). There, the breakdown point is called
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